Keeping the Boss out of the Bedroom: California\u27s Constitutional Right of Privacy as a Limitation on Private Employers\u27 Regulation of Employees\u27 Off-Duty Intimate Association by Shiners, Erich
Masthead Logo McGeorge Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 3 Article 5
1-1-2006
Keeping the Boss out of the Bedroom: California's
Constitutional Right of Privacy as a Limitation on
Private Employers' Regulation of Employees' Off-
Duty Intimate Association
Erich Shiners
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the
Privacy Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erich Shiners, Keeping the Boss out of the Bedroom: California's Constitutional Right of Privacy as a Limitation on Private Employers'
Regulation of Employees' Off-Duty Intimate Association, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 449 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/5
Keeping the Boss Out of the Bedroom: California's
Constitutional Right of Privacy as a Limitation on Private




I. INTRO DUCTION ............................................................................................. 449
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY ................................................. 452
A. The Right of Privacy Under the United States Constitution .................. 452
B. The Right of Privacy Under the California Constitution ...................... 454
III. PRIVATE EMPLOYERS' REGULATION OF EMPLOYEES' OFF-DUTY
INTIM ATE A SSOCIATION .............................................................................. 457
A. Case Law D evelopm ents ........................................................................ 457
B. State "Lifestyle Protection" Statutes ..................................................... 462
1. C olorado ......................................................................................... 462
2. N orth D akota .................................................................................. 464
3. N ew York ......................................................................................... 466
IV . C ALIFORN IA L AW ......................................................................................... 468
A. Labor Code Sections 96(k) and 98.6 ..................................................... 468
B. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy-Tameny Claims ... 473
C. The Constitutional Privacy Right as a Limitation on Private
Employers' C onduct .............................................................................. 475
V. RECOGNIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY AS A BASIS FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS
INVOLVING OFF-DUTY INTIMATE ASSOCIATION ......................................... 480
V I. C O N CLU SIO N ................................................................................................ 484
I. INTRODUCTION
The resignation of Boeing Chief Executive Officer Harry Stonecipher in
March 2005 put the issue of co-worker relationships back in the headlines.
Boeing requested Stonecipher's resignation after an internal investigation
revealed he was conducting an extramarital affair with a female Boeing
executive.' Interestingly, the affair itself did not violate company policy.2 Rather,
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, May 2006; B.A. in History, California State
University, Sacramento, 2001.
1. Carol Hymowitz & Joann S. Lublin, Many Companies Look the Other Way at Employee Affairs,
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the resignation was prompted by Boeing's potential embarrassment in light of
Stonecipher's hiring just fifteen months earlier to "bolster ethical practices" at
the company.' This potential damage to Boeing's reputation provided an
ostensible reason why the resignation was necessary to protect Boeing's business
interests, a justification that, under current law, Boeing need not have made to
successfully defend a wrongful discharge claim by Stonecipher.
The Stonecipher incident was unusual only in that it involved a company
CEO. In a 2003 survey by the American Management Association (AMA), thirty
percent of respondents said they had dated a co-worker.4 Over half of those
relationships "led to marriage or a long-term relationship."5 While employers fear
such relationships will lead to conflicts in the workplace,6 it is not an inevitable
consequence of co-worker dating.7 Perhaps as a result, employees have become
more tolerant of a co-worker romance,8 provided the couple maintains a low
profile in the workplace.9
To date, American courts and legislatures have failed to acknowledge the
increased acceptance of intimate association between co-workers. Most states,
including California, still allow employers to terminate an employee based on his
or her intimate relationship with another employee, even if that relationship has
no effect on the workplace.' While some states have passed laws prohibiting
adverse employment action based on employees' lawful off-duty conduct, these
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2005, at B 1.
2. Id.
3. See id. (reporting that Boeing's Board of Directors concluded Stonecipher's affair violated the
company's code of conduct prohibiting "behavior that may embarrass the company"). The Board was
particularly concerned with a series of sexually explicit e-mail messages between the two participants. Attorney
Karen Kaplowitz speculated that the embarrassment would not have existed, or at least would not have been as
severe, if Stonecipher had been writing them to his wife, thus belying Boeing's statement that it was
unconcerned with the morality of Stonecipher's conduct. Id.
4. Andrea Minarcek, Taboo on Office Romance Fading, Cox NEWS SERV., June 29, 2004, http://www.
azcentral.com/ent/dating/articles/0629officeromance29.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. Id.
6. See Randy Dotinga, To Date, or Not to Date, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0214/pl3s02-wmgn.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (citing a
2002 report by the Society for Human Resource Management and CareerJoumal.com in which eighty-one
percent of human resources officials who responded "said that workplace relationships are dangerous because
they could lead to conflict in the workplace").
7. See Minarcek, supra note 4 (reporting that a relationship between two middle school teachers was
supported by both colleagues and students and that a female bank employee's relationship with her co-worker
and future husband "was so fun that... [she] actually looked forward to work").
8. See id. (reporting that the AMA survey showed two-thirds of respondents approved of employees
dating one another).
9. See Dotinga, supra note 6 ("What bothers people a lot is when [co-workers] act like two lovebirds,
always hugging at lunch, playing footsie under the table, blowing kisses to each other." (quoting Andrew
DuBrin, a psychologist and professor of management)).
10. See I MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.12, at 711 (3d ed. 2004) ("[Cjourts have
upheld the discharge of employees for dating or marrying coworkers."); infra Part lI.A (discussing the current
state of wrongful termination law when discharge is based on co-worker intimate association).
450
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
laws have failed to provide protection for off-duty intimate association." Thus, a
private sector employer currently has legal authority to force an employee to
choose between continuing a relationship with a co-worker and keeping his or
her job, regardless of the relationship's impact on the employer's business
interests. 12
However, California's private sector employees have a potential protection in
this area unavailable to employees in other states: the California Constitution's
article I, section 1 right of privacy. California courts have recognized that this
right applies to intimate association 3 and have also used it as a limitation on
private employers' regulation of their employees' off-duty conduct in the area of
drug testing.'4 Accordingly, California courts should also recognize the privacy
right as a limitation on employers' ability to base employment decisions on off-
duty intimate conduct. Of course, this limitation would not be absolute. As a
defense to a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim, an
employer could show that the relationship genuinely impacted the employer's
business interests. Placing such a burden on the employer would remove the
thumb from the scale favoring the employer's interests, thereby allowing proper
recognition and protection of the employee's privacy interest in his or her off-
duty intimate association.
This Comment begins in Part II with a brief examination of the nature and
scope of the right of privacy under the United States and California
Constitutions. Part III examines case law developments in the field of employer
regulation of employees' off-duty conduct before examining "lifestyle
protection" statutes passed in three states. The Comment's focus then shifts to
California law in Part IV, which first discusses California Labor Code sections
96(k) and 98.6 and the California Courts of Appeal's consistent interpretation of
them as merely procedural guarantees. The next section of Part IV discusses the
tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy as applied in California.
The final section of Part IV examines cases applying California's constitutional
right of privacy in the employment context. Finally, Part V discusses how
recognizing the constitutional right of privacy's protection of intimate association
as a public policy basis for wrongful termination claims would impact
11. See infra Part III.B (discussing "lifestyle protection" statutes in Colorado, New York, and North
Dakota and concluding that none explicitly protect employees' off-duty intimate association).
12. See, e.g., Watkins v. UPS, 797 F. Supp. 1349, 1351-52 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (upholding termination for
refusing to end a relationship with co-worker even though relationship had no impact on the workplace); Ortiz
v. L.A. Police Relief Ass'n, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding termination for refusing
to end an engagement to incarcerated felon because relationship might compromise safety of police officers).
13. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("California's
privacy protection.., embraces sexual relations."); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v. Van De Kamp, 226
Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that "a right of substantive sexual privacy has been firmly
established" under the California Constitution).
14. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the application of the California Constitution's privacy right in the
employment context).
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California's private employers. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that
California should recognize a claim for wrongful termination based on lawful
off-duty intimate association, which an employer could defend based on the
employer's business interests.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. The Right of Privacy Under the United States Constitution
Nowhere in its text does the United States Constitution specifically guarantee
a right of privacy. Nonetheless, forty years ago in Griswold v. Connecticut, the
United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized privacy as a fundamental
right.'5 Writing for the majority, Justice William Douglas noted that though the
First Amendment does not explicitly guarantee a right of association, the Court
has construed it to be a peripheral First Amendment right because "its existence
is necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful."' 6 Generalizing
this construction, he stated that the Bill of Rights' textual guarantees "have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance."' 7 Under this theory, Justice Douglas found the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create "zones of privacy" that, when taken
together, amount to a Constitutional right of privacy."
Applying this newly recognized right, the Court struck down a Connecticut
law prohibiting use of contraceptives.' 9 Justice Douglas found the idea that the
state could intrude into childbearing decisions "repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marital relationship. '20 This right of marital privacy, he
21
said, deserved protection because it was fundamental to our civilization.
22
Though many criticized Griswold at the time of its decision, 2 the Supreme
Court significantly expanded the privacy right it recognized over the last forty
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Id. at 483.
17. Id. at484.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 485.
20. Id. at 485-86.
21. Id. at 486.
22. See, e.g., id. at 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting) (fearing the majority's revival of substantive due
process will upset the principles of separation of powers and federalism); id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I
can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any
case ever before decided by this Court."); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9-10 (1971) (calling Griswold "an unprincipled decision" because it substituted the
Court's own moral and ethical values for those of the community as embodied in the challenged statute); Paul
G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold
Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 252-53 (1965-1966) (criticizing Justice Douglas' use of "the peripheral-
emanations-penumbra" theory to avoid the appearance of reviving substantive due process when in effect that is
what Griswold did).
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years. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court expanded the privacy right to strike down
a state law barring unmarried persons from using contraceptives.23 After holding
that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,24
the Court noted, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child., 25 The right of privacy also formed the basis for the Court's
invalidation of a New York law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to persons
under sixteen years of age in Carey v. Population Services International.
26
While the use of contraceptives is no longer a controversial issue, the right of
privacy has figured in major Supreme Court decisions about two issues that
continue to divide American society: abortion and homosexuality. In Roe v.
Wade, the Court struck down a Texas law forbidding abortion except when
necessary to save the mother's life. 27 After discussing the possible bases of the
privacy right,28 the Court concluded that it is "broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 29 In a later
abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Court stated that the personal autonomy guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment went beyond mere procreation decisions to encompass "the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life."3 °
Homosexual conduct has also been subject to analysis under the
constitutional right of privacy. The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of criminal sodomy laws in Bowers v. Hardwick." Contrary to
its trend of expanding the privacy right, the Court in Bowers held the right did
not apply to homosexual activity because it had no connection to "family,
marriage, or procreation. 32 Justice John Paul Stevens, on the other hand, thought
23. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
24. Id. at 447 (finding that "no [rational] ground exists" for different treatment of married and unmarried
persons under the challenged law).
25. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
26. 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) ("[T]he right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation
extends to minors as well as to adults.").
27. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
28. It took several decisions for the Court to settle on the exact source of this right. In Griswold, Justice
Douglas said it "emanated" from various amendments. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In
his concurring opinion in that case, Justice Goldberg found its basis in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution to the people. Id. at 491-92. The Roe Court, on the other
hand, felt it was "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action." Roe, 10 U.S. at 153. The Court appears to have settled on this latter view, as it was reiterated in
both Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
564 (2003).
29. Roe,410U.S.at 153.
30. 505 U.S. at 851.
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Id. at 191.
453
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the privacy right extended to "nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may
consider offensive or immoral."33 Also in dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun
foreshadowed some of the sentiments the Court's majority would express six
years later in Casey. He wrote that privacy rights are protected "not because they
contribute... to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a
part of an individual's life.
3 4
In 2003, the Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of criminal
sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas.35 Justice Anthony Kennedy began his
majority opinion with a recapitulation of the Court's right of privacy decisions36
before noting that criminal sodomy laws not only prohibit a particular sexual act
but also "seek to control a personal relationship that ... is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals." 7 The Court then
overruled Bowers, finding Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in that case to have
been correct.38
Over the last forty years, the right of privacy under the Federal Constitution
has grown to encompass not only personal decisions regarding marriage3 9 and
procreation,4° but also those concerning sexual conduct and intimate association.4'
Accordingly, the right of privacy provides Americans protection for decisions
and actions that are essential to defining themselves and their place in the world.42
B. The Right of Privacy Under the California Constitution
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution reads: "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
33. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
36. See id. at 564-66 (discussing Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, Carey, and Bowers).
37. Id. at 567.
38. Id. at 578.
39. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is part of the fundamental
'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause"); see also Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (noting that the right to choose one's marriage partner without state intervention is a
"fundamental freedom" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
40. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("[Tjhe right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending that right to unmarried persons); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing the right of married persons to make decisions regarding
procreation without governmental interference).
41. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (noting intimate association is merely a part of the
choice to engage in personal relationships protected by the Constitution); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("[T]he most intimate and personal choices a person may make ... are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
42. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that "intimate
sexual relationships" deserve Constitutional protection because individuals use them as a means of defining
themselves).
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property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."43 The
words "and privacy" were added to section 1 in 1972, when California voters
approved Proposition 11, the Privacy Initiative." Though similar in some respects
to its federal counterpart, the California constitutional right of privacy differs in
three significant ways.
The first and most obvious difference between the federal and California
rights of privacy is that the latter is enumerated clearly in the state constitution's
text.45 Critics of the Supreme Court's recognition of the federal right often cite its
lack of textual basis as a substantial, if not fatal, flaw. 6 By explicitly granting the
privacy right in the state constitution, the voters of California spared the state
right from similar criticism.
The second significant difference lies in the type of actor against whom the
right can be enforced. The federal right, grounded in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, may only be enforced against state actors. 7 The state
right, in contrast, is "self-executing '4' and thus provides a cause of action against
not just a government entity, but also against a private party.49
43. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
44. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633,641 (Cal. 1994).
45. CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (listing among the inalienable rights of all Californians "pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy") (emphasis added).
46. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I can find no such
general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights [or] in any other part of the Constitution."); Bork, supra note 22, at
8-9 (asserting that Justice Douglas' recognition of "zones of privacy" created by the first eight amendments was
"a miracle of transubstantiation" and calling the creation of an independent right of privacy from those zones a
"leap"); Kauper, supra note 22, at 252-53 (concluding Justice Douglas' majority opinion was "ambiguous and
uncertain in its use of the specifics of the Bill of Rights").
47. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("It is settled now ... that the
Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood.") (emphasis added); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (declaring the Court's view that the
"right of privacy [is] founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action") (emphasis added); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1 n. I (2d ed.
1988) ("The Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses limit only state action.").
48. Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); accord Wilkinson v. Times
Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986);
Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980). But see J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327, 433-34
(1992) (arguing that the privacy right does not apply to private action because, in its analysis of the legislative
history of the Privacy Initiative in White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975), the California Supreme Court
erroneously ignored legislative precursors to the initiative that clearly limited the right to protection from
governmental action). The California Supreme Court adopted the Porten rule in Hill, 865 P.2d at 644.
49. Hill, 865 P.2d at 644. In its opinion, the California Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of
the ballot argument for Proposition 11 to determine whether the privacy right could be enforced against private
actors. Id. From the argument's many references to activities of "government and business," the court
concluded the initiative's framers, and thus the voters who approved it, intended for it to apply to both
government and private actors. Id. (emphasis in original). The court then stated that to rule against this intent
"would amount to an electoral 'bait and switch."' Id. Moreover, the court noted that "[a]ny expectations of
privacy would indeed be illusory if only the government's collection and retention of data were restricted." Id.
at 643.
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Finally, the scope of the California privacy right is generally broader than
that of the federal right. 0 Interestingly, while the federal right arose in response
to state intrusions on marital and parental decisions,-" the California right initially
concerned protecting citizens from the increasing ability of governmental and
private entities to collect data about them. 2 Even so, since 1972, California
courts have expanded the privacy right to include protection of marital, sexual,
and reproductive decisions,53 generally following the United States Supreme
Court's post-Griswold cases in protecting "autonomy privacy."" There has been
an exception to this trend in the area of reproductive rights, where the California
courts have afforded more protection for abortion under the state privacy right
than exists under federal law, most notably by extending the right of sexual
privacy to "mature" minors56 and striking down a state law requiring parental
consent before a minor may have an abortion.57
On the other hand, despite ubiquitous statements about the greater breadth of
the state right,58 California courts have not explicitly expanded the privacy right
50. See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Cal. v. Van De Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361, 378 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) ("The California Supreme Court has declared the state constitutional [privacy] right to be much broader
than the privacy rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution."); Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal. 1981) ("[T]he federal right of privacy.., is more limited than the
corresponding right in the California Constitution."); Wilson v. Cal. Health Facilities Comm'n, 167 Cal. Rptr.
801, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) ("The inalienable right of privacy guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the State
Constitution protects a larger zone in the area of financial and personal affairs than the federal right.").
51. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that the right of privacy is the right
"to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding the
idea of "allow[ing] the police to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives" to be "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship").
52. See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 233 (Cal. 1975) ("[Tlhe moving force behind the new
constitutional provision was a more [focused] privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on
personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary
society."); see also Hill, 865 P.2d at 654 (interpreting White as finding "[i]nformational privacy [to be] the core
value furthered by the Privacy Initiative").
53. See Vinson v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("California's privacy
protection ... embraces sexual relations."); Van De Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (finding "a right of substantive
sexual privacy has been firmly established" under the California Constitution); Myers, 625 P.2d at 796 (finding
"a woman's right of procreative choice [is] an aspect of the right of privacy" under the California Constitution).
54. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 650 ("The [United States] Supreme Court has included within the post-
Griswold implicit right to privacy 'certain rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual, and reproductive
matters."').
55. See id. at 654 (reasoning that because "[t]he ballot arguments [for Proposition 11] refer[red] to the
federal constitutional tradition of safeguarding certain intimate and personal decisions from government
interference.... [a]utonomy privacy is also a concern of the Privacy Initiative").
56. Van De Kamp, 226 Cal. Rptr. 361.
57. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997).
58. See, e.g., id. at 808 ("[P]ast California cases establish that, in many contexts, the scope and
application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more protective of privacy then the federal
constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by the federal courts."); Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v.
Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Our state privacy guarantee is broader than the federal
privacy right."); Wilson v. Cal. Health Facilities Comm'n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
456
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regarding marital and sexual decisions beyond the scope granted by the Federal
Constitution. Nonetheless, because it uses the federal right as a base upon which
to expand,59 the state privacy right appears to incorporate the enhanced protection
of intimate relationships recognized in Lawrence.6° Accordingly, the California
right to privacy protects self-defining intimate association at least to the same
extent as the federal Constitution.
III. PRIVATE EMPLOYERS' REGULATION OF EMPLOYEES'
OFF-DUTY INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
A. Case Law Developments
Private sector employees have few protections against adverse employment
action based on their off-duty conduct.6' The wrongful discharge cause of action,
recognized by most states, including California,62 provides a remedy for adverse
employment actions in certain circumstances. The primary purpose of this cause
of action is to promote a state's public policy by prohibiting employment actions
that are contrary to it.63 Employee conduct that may give rise to a wrongful
discharge action falls into four categories: "(1) refusing to perform unlawful acts,
(2) reporting illegal activity .... (3) exercising legal rights, and (4) performing
public duties." 6 Though off-duty intimate association seems to fall within the
category of exercising legal rights, courts generally refused to recognize such
conduct as the basis for a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim.65
At the center of most wrongful discharge cases involving off-duty intimate
association is the employer's anti-fraternization policy. These policies, which
aim to restrict, if not prohibit, romantic and sexual relationships between
(observing that the California constitutional right of privacy "protects a larger zone in the area of financial and
personal affairs than the federal right").
59. See John C. Barker, Note, Constitutional Privacy Rights in the Private Workplace, Under the
Federal and California Constitutions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1107, 1134-35 (1992) (explaining that
"[flederal guarantees provide a floor below which states may not venture" but "[albove that floor, California
courts are free... to define their own levels" of protection).
60. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (stating the "general rule" that the state cannot
"define the meaning of [a personal] relationship or ... set its boundaries" if there is no harm to another person
or the public).
61. 1 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10, § 5.12, at 711.
62. See 2 id. § 9.9, at 438 (listing Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Rhode
Island as the only states that do not recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy).
63. See, e.g., Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
("[I]n order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the
employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified
duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury.").
64. 2 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 9.9, at 439.
65. See id. § 5.12, at 711 (observing that courts have "upheld the discharge of employees for dating or
marrying coworkers").
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employees, vary in form from written policies explicitly addressing the issue to
an implied understanding that employee dating is discouraged.6 Substantively, an
anti-fraternization policy should balance the employer's legitimate business
interests in maintaining workplace productivity and morale67 (and avoiding
liability for sexual harassment in cases of supervisor-subordinate relationships)
6
with employees' privacy rights.69 However, when anti-fraternization policies are
challenged in wrongful discharge suits, courts almost universally defer to the
employers' judgment, giving little, if any, weight to the employees' privacy
interests.70 This has held true regardless of the form of the policy, whether the
fraternization took place within or outside the workplace, and even when the
existence of a relationship was uncertain.
A written anti-fraternization policy was the basis for an employee's
termination in Watkins v. UPS.71 UPS provided its employees with a document,
which included the policy, known as the "Impartial Employment and Promotion
Guide. 72 Watkins, a division manager, was aware of the policy when he began a
romantic relationship with Helen Gable, a truck driver.7 3 When Watkins refused
to end the relationship, UPS fired him. 74 The district court quickly disposed of
Watkins' claim that his discharge violated public policy because Mississippi had
66. See Rebecca J. Wilson, Christine Filosa & Alex Fennel, Romantic Relationships at Work: Does
Privacy Trump the Dating Police?, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 78, 78-79 (2003) (noting that employers "adopt
prophylactic policies in an effort to avoid the potentially complicated and unsavory outcomes of office affairs
and to maintain a strictly professional environment" but that "problems of implementation and enforcement"
often lead them to "rely on unwritten rules").
67. See id. at 79 (noting "employee morale and productivity" are "two business elements that employers
have a vested interest in protecting"); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discrimination in
Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 385-86 (2003) (stating anti-fraternization policies "are
justified by efficiency concerns," such as the fear "that the employees will pay more attention to each other than
to their work").
68. See Sugarman, supra note 67, at 386 (noting that anti-fraternization policies are justified by
employer concerns "that someone might give unfair job preferences to a romantic partner," which would lead to
"sexual harassment problems and claims"); Wilson, Filosa & Fennel, supra note 66, at 79 (predicting that a
supervisor-subordinate relationship would lead co-workers to make charges of preferential treatment, thereby
"trigger[ing] a sexual harassment claim against an employer under Title VH of the Civil Rights Act").
69. See Wilson, Filosa & Fennel, supra note 66, at 87 ("[An anti-fraternization] policy should not
intrude on employees' private affairs unreasonably and should display respect for the personal lives of
employees, while also protecting the employer's interest in avoiding many of the problems that can result from
these romances.").
70. See id. ("The privacy rights of employees typically do not prohibit employers from acting as the
dating police by implementing or enforcing a policy against romantic relationships in the workplace."); see also
1 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 5.12, at 711 ("[C]ourts have upheld discharge of employees for dating or
marrying coworkers.").
71. 797 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
72. Id. at 1351. The policy reads: "Fraternization is discouraged throughout our organization.
Fraternization which includes a supervisory or management employee may be perceived as favoritism or sexual
harassment. Fraternization between a supervisor or manager and an employee is not permissable [sic].
Fraternization is clearly not in the best interest of the company, the manager, or the employee." Id.
73. Id. at 1351-52.
74. Id. at 1352.
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not yet recognized that as a basis for a cause of action.75 Had the state recognized
the cause of action, it is possible the district court would have allowed Watkins'
claim to proceed,76 but, given the trend in other jurisdictions, 7 it would have been
highly unlikely.
Employees have not fared any better challenging implied anti-fraternization
policies. J.C. Penney fired David Patton for dating a co-worker. 7' Though the
company had "no written or unwritten policy, rule or regulation" prohibiting co-
worker dating, other employees told Patton that his manager disfavored
fraternization among co-workers.79 Despite Patton's protests that the relationship
did not affect his work performance in any way, the manager told Patton to end
the relationship. s When he refused, he was fired for "unsatisfactory job
performance."'"
Patton based his wrongful discharge claim on his personal right of privacy, 2
presumably under the United States Constitution. He argued that "his
fundamental, inalienable rights were compromised, put on the auction block, and
made the subject of an illicit barter in that he was forced to forego these rights or
purchase them with his job."3 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected Patton's
wrongful discharge claim on the ground that the right of privacy was only
enforceable against state actors. 84 As a result, the court concluded that Oregon's
private employers "can fire an employee because of dislike of the employee's
personal lifestyle." 5
The termination challenged in Staats v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co.
8 6
apparently was motivated by the employer's disapproval of extramarital affairs.
Staats attended Ohio National's "Council of Honor Convention" with a woman
whom he presented as his wife, even though she was not. Ohio National
terminated him for this action despite Staats' claim that his employer allowed its
employees to "engage in open extramarital relationships with impunity." '
Though recognizing freedom of association as "an important social right, and one
that ordinarily should not dictate employment decisions," the district court held
75. Id. at 1358.
76. See id. at 1351 (reporting UPS had moved for summary judgment).
77. See I ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 5.12, at 711 (noting that in most cases "courts have upheld the
discharge of employees for dating or marrying coworkers").








86. 620 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
87. Id. at 119-20.
88. Id. at 119.
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that the right to fire an employee for "'associat[ing] with' a non-spouse" at a
company function did not threaten any recognized public policy.89 It seems clear,
given the decisions in Watkins, Patton, and Staats, that a private employer is free
to impose its own moral views on employees by threat of termination for
"immoral" intimate association or, at the very least, can use termination to avoid
the potential inconvenience or embarrassment that such conduct may cause.90
Perhaps because many workplace romances lead to marriage, 9' courts have
been no more accepting of marital relationships as a basis for wrongful
termination claims. Patricia McCluskey claimed she was terminated "solely
because she married a co-worker., 92 She based her wrongful termination claim on
Illinois' stated policy of "strengthen[ing] and preserv[ing] the integrity of
marriage."9 In dismissing McCluskey's claim, the Illinois Appellate Court held
that although the fundamental right of privacy protects "personal decisions
relating to marriage," the employer's anti-fraternization policy did not violate
that right because it was "a reasonable regulation that [did] not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter the marital relationship."'9 Thus, the employer's
interest in avoiding workplace problems trumped not only the employee's
privacy interest but also the state's declared interest in promoting the institution
of marriage.
Courts have even found in favor of employers when the existence of a
romantic relationship between co-workers was in dispute. In Born v. Blockbuster
Videos, Inc.,95 two employees were fired for allegedly violating the employer's
policy prohibiting "dating between supervisors/managers and their subordinates"
despite their denial of a romantic involvement. The federal district court held
that because no Iowa statute granted the employees a privacy right, it could not
serve as the basis for their wrongful discharge claim.97 Likewise, in Grzyb v.
Evans,9 the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld Evans' termination for conversing
89. id. at 120.
90. See I ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 5.12, at 711 (observing that employers are "largely free to
impose whatever standards of conduct or discipline they choose").
91. See Minarcek, supra note 4 (citing the 2003 AMA survey which shows that for more than half of the
respondents, their workplace romances "led to marriage or a long-term relationship"); Wilson, Filosa & Fennel,
supra note 66, at 78-79 (citing a 1998 Society for Human Resource Management survey which predicted that
"55 percent of office romances would likely result in marriage").
92. McCluskey v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 498 N.E.2d 559 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
93. Id. at 561 (quoting the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 102(2) (West 1985)).
94. Id.
95. 941 F. Supp. 868 (S.D. Iowa 1996).
96. Id. at 869.
97. See id. (declining "to recognize a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine based
on the common law tort of invasion of privacy by a private person").
98. 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
with a female co-worker" because it found no constitutional provision or statute
guaranteeing Evans' freedom of association with her.' °°
Given the difficulty employees have faced in even getting their wrongful
discharge claims to trial,"" it is not surprising that there have been few cases
decided in their favor. Perhaps the best known of these is a California case,
Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp.'°2 IBM terminated Virginia Rulon-Miller for dating a
competitor's employee, Matt Blum. °3 The relationship, which began when both
were employed by IBM, was well known to many within the company, including
Rulon-Miller's superiors. ' °4 Despite this knowledge and the fact that Rulon-
Miller's performance was above standard, IBM terminated her because the
relationship constituted a "conflict of interest."'' 5 IBM's conflict of interest policy
prohibited outside employment that conflicted "with IBM's business interests.' '1 6
However, it made no mention of personal relationships with competitors. '°7 In
fact, IBM had a company policy that an employee had a "right to hold a job even
though 'off-the-job behavior' might not be approved of by the employee's
manager."' ' s
Though the First District Court of Appeal acknowledged that the California
constitutional right to privacy "could be implicated by the IBM inquiry,"' 9 its
decision was based largely on contract principles. The court found that IBM's
policy of not basing adverse employment action on "outside activities" unless it
created a conflict of interest or disruption of job effectiveness"0 may have created
an implied term in its employees' employment contracts."' Violation of that term
99. Id. at 400.
100. Id. at 401-02.
101. See, e.g., Watkins v. UPS, 797 F. Supp. 1349, 1362 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (granting the employer's
motion for summary judgment); McCluskey v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 498 N.E.2d 559, 562 (I11. App. Ct.
1986) (reversing the trial court's denial of employer's motion to dismiss wrongful discharge claim); Patton v.
J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1986) (affirming the dismissal of a wrongful discharge claim); Staats v.
Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118, 119 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (dismissing a wrongful discharge claim); Born,
941 F. Supp. at 872 (granting the employer's motion to dismiss wrongful discharge claim); Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d
at 402 (upholding the trial court's dismissal of a wrongful discharge claim for failing to state a cause of action).
102. 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
103. Id. at 528.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 530-31.
107. See id. at 531 (stating "IBM did not interpret this policy to prohibit a romantic relationship" with a
competitor's employee).
108. Id. at 530.
109. Id.
110. See id. ("When on-the-job performance is acceptable, I can think of few situations in which outside
activities could result in disciplinary action or dismissal." (quoting a memorandum signed by former IBM
chairman Tom Watson, Jr.)). Later in the memo, Watson wrote: "Action should be taken only when a legitimate
interest of the company is injured or jeopardized." Id.
11. See id. at 529 (stating that whether Rulon-Miller "could reasonably rely on [IBM's] policies
[regarding off-duty conduct] for job protection" was a "threshold inquiry").
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would subject IBM to liability for breach of contract."2 Because Rulon-Miller did
not have access "to sensitive information which could have been useful to
competitors," the jury, according to the court of appeal, correctly found no
conflict of interest in her relationship with Blum."3 Accordingly, IBM breached
its employment contract with Rulon-Miller by firing her based on that
relationship.'
In the larger scheme of wrongful discharge cases, Rulon-Miller has proved
anomalous, primarily because of its basis in contract law, rather than tort law.
Very few employers have a policy like IBM's, which explicitly prohibits
termination based on outside conduct. Moreover, given the decision in that case,
few are likely to adopt one because it will expose them to liability for breach of
contract. Thus, in most states, the wrongful discharge cause of action remains the
only remedy for termination based on an employee's off-duty intimate
association. However, as demonstrated by the foregoing examples, this tort
action provides almost no protection for employees because most states,
including California, refuse to recognize a public policy to protect such conduct.
B. State "Lifestyle Protection" Statutes
Three states, Colorado, New York, and North Dakota, have enacted "lifestyle
protection" statutes forbidding adverse employment decisions based on em-
ployees' off-duty conduct."5 Because protection of off-duty intimate association
varies under each of these statutes, they are discussed separately by state.
1. Colorado
Under Colorado's "lifestyle protection" statute, it is unlawful "for an
employer to terminate any employee due to that employee's engaging in any
lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours."
'" 6
The statute provides exceptions when the prohibition of particular off-duty
conduct is "rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities of
a particular employee"' 1 7 or is "necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any
112. See id. (observing that any action by IBM contrary to Rulon-Miller's reasonable reliance on
company policy "would constitute a violation of her contract rights").
113. Id.at531.
114. See id. at 532 (noting that Rulon-Miller's "right to be free of inquiries concerning her personal life
was based on substantive direct contract rights she had flowing to her from IBM policies"); Marisa Anne
Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not At Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis
for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 651 (2004) ("Because of the protection
extended by IBM's policy [regarding off-duty conduct], Rulon-Miller prevailed on her claim for wrongful
discharge.").
115. Sugarman, supra note 67, at 416.
116. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2004).
117. Id. § 24-34-402.5(l)(a).
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responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of
interest.""..8
As of 2004, only one case, Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C.,"9 had addressed
this statute in relation to off-duty intimate association. On February 19, 1992,
Robert Borquez learned his male partner had been diagnosed with AIDS.'20
Borquez immediately told his employer about this relationship as well as his need
for AIDS testing.' 2' One week later, Borquez was fired.
2
Borquez based his wrongful discharge claim on both the Colorado "lifestyle
protection" statute and a Denver ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation.' 23 At trial the parties agreed to combine the claims into the
single issue of whether Borquez was fired because he was gay. 24 Accordingly,
the jury was not specifically instructed on the statutory requirement that the
discharge be based on Borquez's off-duty activities'25 and thus made no findings
on that fact.
On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the appellant's assertion
that the verdict was based solely on Borquez's status as a homosexual because
the jury was not instructed on the requirements of the "lifestyle protection"
statute. 26 Instead, the court found the jury was presented with sufficient evidence,
particularly Ozer's testimony that he considered homosexual conduct
"improper," to find that Borquez's discharge violated the statute.27 Two years
later, the Colorado Supreme Court held the appellate court's reliance on the
128
"lifestyle protection" statute to support the jury verdict was erroneous. The
court stated that any jury instruction for the statute must necessarily require a
finding that the discharged employee engaged in lawful activity away from the
employer's premises during nonworking hours.' 29 Because the jury instruction
here did not include such a requirement, the court concluded the jury was not
instructed properly on the issue and thus its verdict could not support liability
based on the statute.'
30
Because of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision, no precedential case law
currently exists interpreting the state's "lifestyle protection" statute in the context
118. Id. § 24-34-402.5(1)(b).
119. 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (Borquez 1).




124. Id. at 170-71.
125. Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 375-76 (Colo. 1997) (Borquez 11) (finding the trial
court "did not instruct the jury pursuant to the lawful activities statute").
126. Borquez 1, 923 P.2d at 171.
127. Id.
128. Borquez H, 940 P.2d at 376.
129. Id. at 375.
130. Id. at 376.
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of off-duty intimate association. However, the Colorado Court of Appeals'
decision seems to indicate that statutory protection is broad enough to encompass
even conduct that employers may consider "immoral." Accordingly, Colorado's
statute appears to provide employees more protection than is available under
common law wrongful discharge doctrine in other states.
2. North Dakota
Though its wording is similar,'3 ' North Dakota's "lifestyle protection" statute
is not a stand-alone law like Colorado's but instead is included in the North
Dakota Human Rights Act's provision "outlin[ing] exceptions to the employment
at-will doctrine."'32 The provision prohibits employment discrimination based on,
inter alia, "participation in a lawful activity off the employer's premises during
nonworking hours."'33 However, it also provides an exception when the
employee's conduct "direct[ly] conflict[s] with the essential business-related
interests of the employer."'' 34 In 1993, this language replaced the original
exception for activity that "was contrary to a bona fide occupational qualification
that reasonably and rationally related to employment activities and the
responsibilities of a particular employee,"'35 phrasing essentially identical to that
in the Colorado statute's exception.
36
Also like Colorado, North Dakota's "lifestyle protection" statute has been
interpreted only once by a court in the context of off-duty intimate association. In
Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes,37 the North Dakota Supreme Court
provided some guidance regarding off-duty sexual conduct as lawful activity and
as a direct conflict with an employer's interests without firmly resolving either
issue. 3 8 In December 1994, David Hougum, a staff chaplain at Valley Memorial
Homes (VMH), was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct for
131. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2004) ("It is a discriminatory practice for an employer
to... discharge an employee ... because of ... participation in lawful activity off the employer's premises
during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the
employer."), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2004) ("It shall be a discriminatory or unfair
employment practice for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee due to that employee's
engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours . .
132. Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 820 (N.D. 1998).
133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2004).
134. Id.
135. Hougum, 574 N.W.2d at 821.
136. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (1991) (quoted in text), with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
24-34-402.5(1)(a) (West 2004) (providing an exception for employee conduct that "[rielates to a bona fide
occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and
responsibilities of a particular employee").
137. 574 N.W.2d 812.
138. See Pagnattaro, supra note 114, at 662 (concluding that while a genuine factual issue existed as to
whether Hougum's conduct was a "direct conflict" with his employer's interests, the court should have
determined whether his conduct was lawful as a matter of law).
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masturbating in a Sears restroom. 3 9 A month later VMH fired Hougum "due to
the Sears incident.' '40 The charge was dropped a week later.'4' Hougum sued
VMH for, inter alia, violation of the "lifestyle protection" statute.'4 2 The trial
court granted summary judgment for VMH on all claims.
43
In discussing Hougum's Human Rights Act claim, the North Dakota
Supreme Court observed that state's law prohibits masturbation "in a public
place."'" But it also recognized that an enclosed restroom stall might be public or
private depending on the actor's reasonable expectation that his conduct would
be seen by others. 1 5 Because that factual determination could not be made on the
existing record, the court refused to decide whether "Hougum's conduct in the
Sears restroom constituted either lawful or unlawful activity.' 46 Moreover,
because the potential "business and economic conflicts of interest" between
Hougum's off-duty conduct and VMH's business were not of the right type, the
court declined to hold that Hougum's alleged loss of effectiveness with VMH's
residents was sufficient to constitute a "direct conflict" under the statute's
exception. 1
47
Because of the North Dakota Supreme Court's refusal to decide these issues,
it is unclear what constitutes "lawful activity" or "direct conflict" under the
state's lifestyle protection statute. Nonetheless, the court appeared to say that the
statute protects all off-duty lawful sexual activity that does not affect the
employer's "essential business related interests.' 4 s It apparently rejected the idea
that an employer's mere disapproval of, or embarrassment resulting from, the
employee's off-duty conduct is sufficient to support termination under the
statute's "direct conflict" exception.49  Thus, as in Colorado, North Dakota
employees apparently receive more protection for their off-duty intimate
association than employees in states without "lifestyle protection" statutes.
139. Hougum, 574 N.W.2d at 815.
140. Id.
141. See id. ("[The] charge was dismissed with prejudice on January 25, 1995.").
142. See id. ("Hougum... sued VMH for violation of the North Dakota Human Rights Act, wrongful
termination, breach of contract, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.").
143. Id.
144. Id. at 821.
145. See id. at 822 (discussing how some jurisdictions define a public place by whether "the actor might
reasonably expect conduct [in that place] to be seen by others").
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 821 (stating that the statute was enacted to "preclude employers from inquiring into an
employee's non-work conduct, including an employee's weight and smoking, marital, or sexual habits" and that
the 1993 amendments merely seek to protect employers when the employee's off-duty conduct is "deleterious
to the well-being of the employer's mission") (emphasis added).
149. See id. at 822 (finding the "potential conflicts raised by VMH" were different from those arising
when an employee's off-duty business conflicts with that of his employer).
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3. New York
New York's "lifestyle protection" statute differs from those of Colorado and
North Dakota in two significant ways. First, the New York law's scope is much
narrower than those of the other two states. 5° Second, New York case law
explicitly addressed whether the statute protects off-duty intimate association.'5 '
New York's "lifestyle protection" statute makes it unlawful for an employer
to discharge an employee based on the employee's off-duty political activities,
off-duty consumption of legal products, off-duty legal recreational activities, or
union membership. 52 "Recreational activities" are defined as "any lawful,
leisure-time activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and
which is generally engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited
to sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies
and similar material."'5 3 All of the cases under this statute involving employees'
off-duty intimate association have argued that such conduct falls within the
definition of "recreational activity."'
54
The first case to address the issue of off-duty intimate association under the
statute, State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,"' was brought by the New York Attorney
General on behalf of two employees discharged for violating Wal-Mart's anti-
fraternization policy. 56 That policy prohibited a "dating relationship" between a
married employee and a co-worker who is not his or her spouse."' The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court held that because none of the recreational
activities listed in the statute necessarily involved romance, the Legislature did
not intend to include intimate relationships within its scope of protection.5 8 In
dissent, Justice Yesawich concluded that dating must fall within "recreational
activity" because otherwise only social relationships without a romantic
component would be protected from employer regulation. "9
150. See Sugarman, supra note 67, at 417 (noting that while Colorado and North Dakota "have adopted
sweeping provisions" prohibiting employment discrimination based on off-duty conduct, New York's statute
"lists four broad categories of off-duty conduct that employers generally may not use in making employment
decisions").
151. See id. (observing that the first two reported cases interpreting New York's law involved "personal
relationships-i.e. dating"); Pagnattaro, supra note 114, at 654 (noting most of the cases "interpreting the scope
of [New York's "lifestyle protection" statute] ... pertain to an employee's off-duty personal relationships").
152. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002).
153. Id. § 201-d(l)(b).
154. See Pagnattaro, supra note 114, at 654 (noting that cases "pertain[ing] to an employee's off-duty
personal relationships" have been based on "the scope of 'legal recreational activities' under section 201-d);
Sugarman, supra note 67, at 417 (reporting that employees in the first two cases filed under section 201-d and
"cleverly argued that dating is a recreational activity and should therefore be covered by the New York law").
155. 621 N.Y.S.2d 151, 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
156. Id. at 151; see Pagnattaro, supra note 114, at 654-55 (noting the original action in the Wal-Mart
case was brought by the New York Attorney General on behalf of the employees).
157. Wal-Mart, 621 N.Y.S.2d 151, 151.
158. Id. at 152.
159. Id. at 153 (Yesawich, J., dissenting).
466
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This broader view was adopted by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Pasch v. Katz Media Corp.'60 Katz demoted
Judy Pasch two days after her live-in boyfriend, Mark Braunstein, was fired from
his position as vice-president with the company.' 6' Pasch argued the sole basis for
the demotion was her continuing relationship with Braunstein and that this
constituted constructive discharge in violation of New York's "lifestyle
protection" statute. 62 In reaching a different conclusion than the Wal-Mart court,
the district court found that both the statute's legislative sponsors and then-
Governor Mario Cuomo intended the statute to apply to all off-duty conduct that
does not create "a material conflict of interest with the employer's business
interests.' 63 Accordingly, the court concluded that cohabitation that does not
create such a conflict is protected under the "recreational activities" category of
the statute.' 6 Three years later, the same district court held that "a close personal
friendship is analogous to co-habitation" and is thus also protected under New
York's "lifestyle protection" statute.'
65
These cases were soon overruled by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp.66 In his
complaint, Jess McCavitt alleged termination in violation of New York's
"lifestyle protection" statute for dating a fellow Swiss Re officer, Diane Butler,
even though the relationship had no negative effect on either party's work
performance.16 Finding no "persuasive evidence" that the New York Court of
Appeals would rule otherwise, the Second Circuit held it was bound to follow the
Appellate Division's decision in Wal-Mart that "romantic dating is not a
protected 'recreational activity' under the statute."' 61 Concurring "grudgingly" in
the decision, Judge McLaughlin opined that "[it is repugnant to our most basic
ideals in a free society that an employer can destroy an individual's livelihood on
the basis of whom he is courting, without first having to establish that the
employee's relationship is adversely affecting the employer's business
interests. ,7 For this reason, he hoped the New York Court of Appeals would
find intimate association protected under the statute if given the opportunity.'
7'
160. No. 94 Civ. 8554 (RPP), 1995 WL 469710 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995).
161. Id. at*l.
162. Id. at*l1-2.
163. Id. at *3.
164. Id.
165. Aquilone v. Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y., No. 98 Civ. 5451 (SAS), 1998 WL 872425, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1998).
166. 237 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2001).
167. Id. at 166-67.
168. Id. at 168.
169. Id. at 169 (McLaughlin, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 170.
171. Id.
2006 /Keeping the Boss Out of the Bedroom
In sum, state "lifestyle protection" statutes do not clearly protect employees
from adverse employment decisions based on their off-duty intimate association.
None of the three statutes explicitly safeguards such activity . Though both the
Colorado and North Dakota Supreme Courts recognize that their state's statute
might apply to off-duty intimate association, neither has held so unequivocally.
The New York Court of Appeals has not weighed in on that state's "lifestyle
protection" statute74 but lower state courts,'
75 as well as the Second Circuit, 176
have held that it does not apply to "romantic dating." Accordingly, "lifestyle
protection" statutes, as they currently exist in the three states that have enacted
them, do not adequately protect employees' privacy interests in their off-duty
intimate associations.
IV. CALIFORNIA LAW
A. Labor Code Sections 96(k) and 98.6
Section 96 of the California Labor Code allows the Labor Commissioner to
take assignment of specified types of employee claims against employers.
77
Subsection (k), added by the California Legislature in 1999,178 provides for
assignment of employee "[c]laims for loss of wages as the result of demotion,
suspension, or discharge from employment for lawful conduct occurring during
nonworking hours away from the employer's premises."'179 Finding "that allowing
any employer to deprive an employee of any constitutionally guaranteed civil
liberties, regardless of the rationale offered, is not in the public interest," the
Legislature declared this subsection "necessary to further the state interest in
protecting the civil rights of individual employees who would not otherwise be
able to protect themselves."'' °
172. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(l)(a) (West 2004) (prohibiting termination for "any
lawful activity" engaged in off the employer's premises during nonworking hours); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
02.4-03 (2004); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2002) (prohibiting termination based on "legal
recreational activities" engaged in off the employer's premises during non-working hours).
173. See Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 822 (N.D. 1998) (holding plaintiff "raised
a disputed factual issue about whether his conduct was not forbidden by law and therefore may fit within the
protected status of lawful activity off the employer's premises"); Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d
371, 376 (Colo. 1997) (holding that Colorado's "lawful activities" statute could not support liability for
plaintiff's discharge because the jury was not instructed on it).
174. McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).
175. New York v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Hudson v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 725 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, 729
N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
176. McCavitt, 237 F.3d at 168.
177. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96 (West 2003).
178. See 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 692 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k)).
179. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k).
180. 1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 692, § 1.
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Section 96(k) caused immediate concern among employers' counsel, many
of whom read the statutory text quite broadly."' For example, a 2000
Employment Law Newsletter from the Continuing Education Division of the
California Bar Association said that "if interpreted literally, this statute could
result in administrative awards of back pay anytime an employer suspends,
demotes, or terminates an employee for anything done outside of work that is not




Others observed that the text was broad enough to encompass off-duty activities
traditionally subject to employer regulation, such as moonlighting'83 and
employee fraternization.'4 In the end, however, most concluded that section
96(k)'s language was unclear' 5 and therefore other sources of interpretation must
be consulted to determine its intended meaning.
Many early commentators looked to "lifestyle protection" statutes passed by
other states. Comparing section 96(k) to statutes on the books in Colorado, New
York, and North Dakota,'86 they generally agreed that California's "version" was
much broader.8 7 More specifically, commentators noted section 96(k), unlike the
other statutes, applies to demotions and suspensions rather than just
terminations' and has no exception for conduct that creates a conflict of interest
181. E.g., Thelen, Reid, & Priest, LLP, Thelen Reid Report No. 63, June 18, 2002, http://www.
thelenreid.com/articles/report/rep63.htm [hereinafter Thelen Reid Report] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) ("Although it appears that the goal of the Legislature was to protect civil rights, the actual text of the
amendment is much broader."); Mike Sullivan & Denise Nash, Labor Code Section 96(k): A Necessary
Protection for Employees or a Legislative Blunder?, CASE 'N POINT, http://www.ceb.com/newslettervl/
employmentjlaw.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing section
96(k)'s language as "broad" and "unqualified").
182. Sullivan & Nash, supra note 181.
183. E.g., Thelen Reid Report, supra note 181 ("[A] Deputy Labor Commissioner stated that he would
find a violation of Section 96(k) if an employee was fired for moonlighting during hours when the employee
was not otherwise required to be at work for the employer."); California Labor Code Section 96(k): Can
Employers Still Discipline Employees for Violating Company Policies Regarding Off-Duty Conduct, MORRISON
& FOERSTER NEWS, Apr. 2001, available at http://www.mofo.com/news (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (noting "moonlighting for a competitor" may be protected under section 96(k)).
184. See, e.g., Sullivan & Nash, supra note 181 (observing that section 96(k) directly conflicts with
California case law upholding termination for "violating an employer's anti-fraternization policies"); Thelen
Reid Report, supra note 181 (describing "enforcement of nonfratemization policies" as one of the "potential
problem areas" under section 96(k)).
185. MORRISON & FOERSTER NEWS, supra note 183 ("[T]he plain language of subdivision (k) appears
much broader than the Attorney General's [narrower] interpretation."); Thelen Reid Report, supra note 181
(stating section 96(k) is "unclear" about what "nonworking hours" and "away from the employer's premises"
mean); Sullivan & Nash, supra note 181 (calling section 96(k)'s text "broad, unqualified language").
186. See supra Part ILI.B (discussing Colorado, North Dakota, and New York "lifestyle protection"
statutes).
187. E.g., MORRISON & FOERSTER NEWS, supra note 183 (observing that "[oin its face, California's
statute is broader" than those of other states); Thelen Reid Report, supra note 181 (noting that other states' laws
"differ in that they have provided explicit exceptions to their otherwise broad laws").
188. See id. ("California's statute is more strict than the statutes enacted in Colorado and New York as it
covers demotions and suspensions as well as terminations."); MORRISON & FOERSTER NEWS, supra note 183
("California's statute is broader than Colorado's because it covers employment actions that include demotions
and suspensions, not just terminations.").
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with the employer's business 9  Subsequent legal commentaries have included
section 96(k) in discussions of state "lifestyle protection" statutes,' 90 similarly
noting its much broader scope in comparison to statutes of other states.
The other interpretive source cited by early commentators was an October
2000 Opinion of the California Attorney General.' 9' This Opinion specifically
addressed whether section 96(k) "abrogate[d] existing law that permits the
disciplining of police officers for off-duty conduct occurring away from their
place of employment that is otherwise lawful but conflicts with their duties as
peace officers.' 92 Noting that section 96 of the California Labor Code has never
"served as an original source of employee rights against employers," the
Attorney General found that subsection (k) did not allow the Labor
Commissioner to assert claims on behalf of peace officers for employment action
based on lawful but "incompatible" off-duty conduct because those claims were
not cognizable under existing California law."' Based on statutory construction
and legislative history, the Attorney General concluded that section 96(k) "did
not create new substantive rights for employees" but instead merely "established
a procedural mechanism that allows the Commissioner to assert, on behalf of
employees, their independently recognized constitutional rights."'194
After an initial unreported decision to the contrary,' 95 the California Courts of
Appeal consistently adopted the Attorney General's "procedure only" approach
to section 96(k). Because the first two of these decisions were unreported, 196 it
was not until late 2003 that a precedential decision interpreting section 96(k) was
issued, in Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp.97 Robert Barbee, head
of Household Automotive Finance's sales force was fired for continuing an
189. See id. (asserting section 96(k), unlike statutes in Colorado and New York, prohibits employment
action based on lawful off-duty conduct "regardless of whether it creates a conflict of interest or otherwise
affects an employer's legitimate business interests"); Sullivan & Nash, supra note 181 (noting section 96(k),
unlike Colorado's and New York's statutes, lacks a specific exclusion for employers' conflict of interest
policies).
190. E.g., Jason Bosch, Note, None of Your Business (Interest): The Argument for Protecting All
Employee Behavior with No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 639, 654-57 (2003) (including section 96(k) in
"Lifestyle Protection Statutes" section); Pagnattaro, supra note 114, at 646-52 (discussing section 96(k) in a
section entitled "State Statutory Protection of Off-Duty Conduct").
191. See MORRISON & FOERSTER NEws, supra note 183 (identifying the Attorney General's 2000
Opinion as a "possible [source assisting] employers in determining the meaning and scope of subdivision (k)");
Thelen Reid Report, supra note 181 (discussing the same Attorney General Opinion).
192. 83 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 227 (2000).
193. Id. at 229.
194. Id. at 230.
195. See Tavani v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. A095770, 2002 WL 31623684, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov.
21, 2002) (assuming section 96(k) provides substantive rights but finding it inapplicable to claims for wrongful
termination because, though plaintiff's conduct occurred outside the employer's premises, "it diminished
Tavani's credibility and effectiveness as a manager at Levi").
196. Paloma v. City of Newark, No. A098022, 2003 WL 122790, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003);
Agabao v. Delta Design, Inc., No. D039642, 2003 WL 194950, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2003).
197. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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intimate relationship with a subordinate sales force member, Melanie Tomita.'9 8
Barbee argued that section 96(k), and in particular the uncodified findings that
accompanied its enactment,' 99 established a public policy against termination
based on lawful off-duty conduct. °° Consequently, Barbee contended that his
termination by Household Automotive Finance was wrongful because it violated
that public policy.20'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected Barbee's section 96(k)
argument. Just as the Attorney General had done three years before, the court
found that Labor Code section 96 does not "describe any public policies," but
rather, "simply outlines the types of claims over which the Labor Commissioner
shall exercise jurisdiction. 2 2 Accordingly, "subsection (k) does not create any
new public policies;" it merely "authorizes the Labor Commissioner to vindicate
existing public policies in favor of individual employees. 2 3 Based on this
finding, the court held that section 96(k) did not provide an independent public
policy basis for Barbee's wrongful termination in violation of public policy
claim.2°4
Seven months after its Barbee decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
in Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp. ,20 interpreted section 96(k)'s companion
provision, Labor Code section 98.6, as also being merely procedural in nature.
Section 98.6, enacted in 2001,20 6 prohibits adverse employment action against an
employee or applicant for engaging in "any conduct delineated in this chapter,
including the conduct described in subdivision (k) of section 96" or for filing a
complaint relating to the employee's or applicant's rights under the Labor
Code.2 7 Such action by an employer constitutes a misdemeanor.2 As with
section 96(k), the enactment of section 98.6 was accompanied by legislative
findings that "working men and women are ill-equipped and unduly
disadvantaged in any effort to assert their individual rights otherwise protected
by the Labor Code" and thus it was "necessary and appropriate to provide
employees an inexpensive administrative remedy for the pursuit of their rights
under the Labor Code.' '2°
198. Id. at 408-09.
199. See id. at 413-14. The court found the statement "allowing any employer to deprive an employee of
any constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties, regardless of the rationale offered, is not in the public interest" to
mean the Labor Commissioner had appropriate authority to assert existing claims on behalf of individual
employees. Id. (citing uncodified findings in1999 Cal. Stat. ch. 692, § 1).
200. Id. at 412-14.
201. Id. at 412.
202. Id. at 413.
203. Id. at 414.
204. Id.
205. 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
206. See 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 820 (enacting CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6).
207. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6(a) (West 2003).
208. Id. § 98.6(b).
209. 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 820, § 1.
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In the first (and to date only) case interpreting section 98.6, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal used Barbee to limit the section's scope to constitutional
claims. San Diego Hospice Corporation, a private employer, fired Joan Grinzi for
her membership in Women's Garden Circle, "an investment group Hospice
believed to be an illegal pyramid scheme., 2'0 After rejecting Grinzi's claims that
both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution" ' and California
Labor Code section 96(k)212 provided public policy bases for her wrongful
discharge claim, the court turned to section 98.6 as a basis for the claim. The
Fourth District quickly dismissed Grinzi's assertion that section 98.6's
incorporation by reference of section 96(k) created a substantive right.1 3 Citing
Barbee, the court noted that section 96(k) protects only "recognized
constitutional rights" and thus only adverse employment actions based on the
assertion of those rights are proscribed by section 98.6.1 Because Grinzi failed
to allege a violation of her constitutional rights, the court held that she failed to
state a claim under section 98.6."5
The Fourth District's interpretation of Labor Code sections 96(k) and 98.6 is
clear: both sections merely provide procedural guarantees for exercising rights
already conferred by California law. To date, the California Legislature has not
acted to counter this interpretation nor has another California District Court of
Appeal ruled contrary to the Fourth District. Thus, assertions made soon after
enactment 6 (and still made by some) 27 that these sections constituted a "lifestyle
protection" statute for California similar to those in Colorado, New York, and
North Dakota were apparently incorrect. Moreover, given the current climate
favoring restriction of employees' legal remedies against employers, 21 s it is
210. Grinzi, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 896.
211. See id. at 898-901 (rejecting Grinzi's First Amendment claim because her employer was not a
governmental entity). Because Grinzi did not specifically allege a state constitutional basis for her claim, the
court did not "reach the issue of whether [similar provisions in] the California Constitution [regarding free
speech and association] support public policy against terminations." Id. at 898 n.3. Interestingly, the Fourth
District used the California Constitution's right of privacy to distinguish the First Amendment as a public policy
basis for wrongful termination claims based on the California provision's application against private actors,
thereby implying the state privacy right would support such a claim. Id. at 899.
212. See id. at 901 (reiterating Barbee's holding that section 96(k) is merely a procedural guarantee).
213. See id. at 901-02 (allowing Grinzi to raise "[flor the first time on appeal ... section 98.6 as a
statutory provision supporting public policy against termination for lawful conduct during nonworking hours").
214. Id. at 903.
215. Id. The Fourth District also dismissed Grinzi's claim that section 98.6 protected exercise of "any
right" regardless of its source, holding the uncodified expression of legislative intent clearly limited the
section's application to retaliatory employment actions based on assertion of rights under the California Labor
Code. Id. at 903-04.
216. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., L. CAMILLE HEBERT, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 13:11.50 (2004) (criticizing Barbee
and Grinzi for "narrow interpretations" of sections 96(k) and 98.6 that "do not appear to be compelled by the
literal terms of the statute" and predicting that as so interpreted these sections "will provide little protection to
private sector employees").
218. See, e.g., 2004 Cal. Stat. ch 221 (modifying California Labor Code section 2699 to require
employees to meet certain procedural requirements before filing private suits against their employers for Labor
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unlikely the Legislature will pass such a statute in the near future. Absent
statutory protection for lawful off-duty activity, California employees must look
to existing sources of public policy to support wrongful discharge tort claims
based on termination for engaging in such conduct." 9
B. Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy-Tameny Claims
California was the first state to recognize a tort claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy.220 Referencing the leading California Supreme Court
case on this issue, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,221 such claims are commonly
known as Tameny claims. The threshold question in a Tameny claim is whether
the conduct for which the employee was terminated is protected by public
policy. 222 California courts use a four-part test to determine whether a policy is
"public., 223 The policy must be: (1) based on a constitutional or statutory
provision; (2) for the benefit of the public, not just to the individual asserting it;
(3) well established at the time of discharge; and (4) substantial and
fundamental.224 A review of the case law development of this test is necessary
before analyzing whether California's constitutional privacy right is considered a
public policy supporting a wrongful discharge claim for termination based on
off-duty intimate association.
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters is the seminal
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy case.225 Peter Petermann alleged
he was fired for refusing to give false testimony before a legislative committee.226
The Second District Court of Appeal first found that California had a clear public
Code violations); Cal. Proposition 64 (2004) (amending California Business and Professions Code sections
17203 and 17204 to eliminate class action suits under California's Unfair Competition Law). The Unfair
Competition Law provides an alternative means of remedying employers' Labor Code violations. See, e.g.,
United Farm Workers v. Dutra Farms, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding farm workers' claim
that their employer bribed them to influence other employees regarding union representation supported liability
under California's Unfair Competition Law).
219. See Barbee v. Household Automotive Fin. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
("[T]o prevail on a public policy claim... Barbee must establish that he was terminated for asserting civil
rights guaranteed by article I of the California Constitution."); Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr.
3d 893, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding a termination in violation of public policy claim must be based on an
assertion of "a recognized constitutional right").
220. See 2 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, § 9.10, at 443 (labeling Petermann v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), "the earliest wrongful discharge [in violation of public policy]
case").
221. 610P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
222. See 1 MING W. CHIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION,
Employment Tort Claims § 5:45 (2003) ("The existence of a pertinent public policy is crucial to a Tameny
claim.").
223. Id. § 5:46.
224. Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 703 (Cal. 2002) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
225. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
226. Id. at 26.
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policy against perjury because it criminalized the act under Penal Code section
118.227 This policy was so fundamental, the court said, that "every impediment,
however remote to the [policy's] objective, must be struck down when
encountered., 2" The Second District then held that Petermann's complaint
sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful discharge 229 because to do otherwise
"would be to encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee and
employer., 230 The California Supreme Court's definitive adoption of the wrongful
discharge cause of action in Tameny was based on similar facts. Gordon Tameny
was fired by Atlantic Richfield after fifteen years of service because he refused to
participate in an illegal price fixing scheme.23' Finding such a scheme to violate,
inter alia, California's Cartwright Antitrust Act,232 the Supreme Court upheld
Tameny's wrongful discharge claim.233 Because both of these cases rested on
clear violations of California statutes, neither provided guidance about other
sources of public policy that might support a tort claim for wrongful discharge.
Unfortunately for California's Courts of Appeal, which had split over
whether public policy must be "rooted in a statute or constitutional provision, 2 3
the California Supreme Court failed to resolve the issue in its next wrongful
235discharge in violation of public policy case, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
However, the court did provide guidance regarding when a policy is considered
"public." Daniel Foley was fired after informing his employer that his new
supervisor was under investigation for embezzling funds from his previous
employer.236 The California Supreme Court found no clear statutory basis for a
policy requiring an employee to pass on such information to his or her
employer.237 Observing that prior wrongful discharge cases involved policies
intended to protect the public, such as those requiring criminal activity to be
reported to proper authorities, the court held that when a duty to disclose "serves
only the private interest of the employer," that duty cannot form the basis for a
Tameny claim.238 In short, because Foley's disclosure benefited only Interactive
Data, not the public at large, it was not protected by the public policy exception
to the at-will employment doctrine. Additionally, Foley established the
227. Id. at 27.
228. Id. at 28.
229. See id. ("[P]laintiff alleged sufficient facts to show that his discharge was improper.").
230. Id. at 27.
231. Tameny v. At. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331-32 (Cal. 1980).
232. See id. at 1331 (repeating complaint's allegations that Arco's conduct violated "express provisions
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Cartwright Act" and a federal court consent decree) (citations omitted); id. at
1334 n.9 (noting Arco's concession that, if true, the complaint's allegations would establish that Arco violated
antitrust laws).
233. Id. at 1337.
234. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 378-79 (Cal. 1988).
235. Id. at 373.
236. Id. at 375-76.
237. Id. at 379.
238. Id. at 380.
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requirement that the policy be "firmly established" at the time of discharge239 to
provide employers with adequate notice of conduct that will subject them to tort
liability.240
The issue left outstanding in Foley, whether public policy must be "rooted
in" statutory or constitutional provisions, was answered in the affirmative by the
California Supreme Court in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance.24' Citing Foley for the
proposition that a policy must be "fundamental" and "substantial" to support a
Tameny claim, the court acknowledged the difficulty in drawing a line between
"claims that genuinely involve matters of public policy, and those that concern
merely ordinary disputes between employer and employee. 242 The court's
solution to this problem was to require that a policy supporting a wrongful
discharge claim have "a basis in either the constitution or statutory provisions. 243
This approach "strikes the proper balance among the interests of employers,
employees and the public" by giving employers adequate notice of "the
fundamental public policies of the state and nation."2" The California Supreme
Court has since expanded the basis of public policy to include administrative
regulations "promulgated to address important public safety concerns.'
The protection of intimate association under the article I, section 1 privacy
right appears to qualify under the four prong "public policy" test. First, the
protection of intimate association is clearly based on a constitutional provision,
article I, section l's enumeration of "privacy" as one of Californian's
"inalienable rights." Second, though upholding the privacy right in any individual
case will benefit the affected employee, it will also benefit the public by limiting
employers' ability to condition employment on conformance with an employers'
particular views on morality or workplace efficiency. Third, protection of
intimate association, though recently the spotlight of national attention in
Lawrence, has been part of California law for at least a decade. Finally, in
accordance with the constitutional classification of privacy as an "inalienable
right," California courts have consistently described protection of intimate
association as a fundamental right.
C. The Constitutional Privacy Right as a Limitation on Private Employers'
Conduct
To date, California courts have recognized the state constitution's article I
right of privacy as a potential limitation on private employers' conduct in three
239. Id. at 378.
240. Stevenson v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 892 (Cal. 1997).
241. 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
242. Id. at 684.
243. Id. at 687-88.
244. Id. at 688.
245. Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Cal. 1998).
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specific areas: drug testing, psychological screening, and, most importantly,
termination based on marriage. An examination of the major California Court of
Appeal cases in each of these areas provides insight into the scope of the privacy
right in the private employment context. This inquiry also shows how the courts
balance this right against the employer's interests in regulating particular
conduct.
The first drug testing privacy case, Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp.,246 came
before the First District Court of Appeal in 1989. Times Mirror required all job
applicants to pass a physical examination including a urine test for drugs and
alcohol. 7 Three applicants who refused to take the drug test and were thus
denied jobs with Times Mirror's subsidiary, Matthew Bender and Company, sued
the employer claiming the testing policy violated their right of privacy under the
California Constitution.24 8 Noting that the constitutional privacy right is not
absolute, the First District Court stated that "[a] court must engage in a balancing
of interests" in deciding claims alleging an invasion of that right.249 Following
recent United States Supreme Court drug testing cases, the court of appeal
adopted a reasonableness test25' that balanced the intrusiveness of the testing, and
therefore the applicants' reasonable expectations of privacy, against the
employer's interest in testing.252
Recognizing that the applicants had a privacy interest in the collection and
testing of their urine, the court then specifically identified three factors that
reduced their privacy expectation in this situation. 25 ' First, the plaintiffs'
expectation was lower because the application process necessarily entails the
disclosure of personal information.54 Second, the court found that the applicants
had explicit notice that passing the test was required for employment. 255 Finally,
because the sample was collected in a medical environment and the actual results
were not disclosed to the employer, the intrusion into applicants' privacy was
minimal. Consequently, because Matthew Bender's testing procedures
246. 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
247. Id. at 196.
248. Id. at 197.
249. Id. at 202.
250. See id. at 201 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), that urine testing for drugs was constitutionally permissible under a test
balancing employee's privacy interest against the employer's interest in public safety and noting the Supreme
Court's holding in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), that the
government's compelling interest in public safety justified testing Customs Service agents for drugs).
251. See id. at 203 (stating that, absent a substantial burden on the privacy right, "the operative question
is whether the challenged conduct is reasonable").
252. Cf Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 (adopting a test balancing the employee's privacy interest against the
employer's interest in testing to determine whether drug testing is reasonable under Fourth Amendment).
253. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 203-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
254. Id. at 204.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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significantly reduced the applicants' expectations of privacy, the court held the
employer's "legitimate interest in a drug- and alcohol-free work environment"
outweighed the applicants' privacy interest.
Two months later, another division of the Fourth District reached the
opposite conclusion regarding drug testing of existing employees in Luck v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co.25 Barbara Luck, a successful employee of
Southern Pacific's engineering department,259 was fired when she refused to
provide a urine sample for drug testing.26 Citing Wilkinson, the court noted that
the collection of urine for drug testing "intrudes upon reasonable expectations of
privacy."26' However, the court quickly departed from Wilkinson, finding that a
compelling interest standard, rather than one based on reasonableness, applied
because Luck was an employee of Southern Pacific, not merely a job applicant.262
Dismissing the employer's assertion that the testing served its interests in
"deterrence, efficiency, competence, creating a drug-free environment, enforcing
rules against drug use, and ensuring public confidence in the integrity of the
railroad industry, ' 263 the First District examined the only interest that might be
compelling enough to justify the invasion of Luck's privacy: safety. Though
Luck worked for a railroad, her job as a computer programmer took place
entirely within the railroad's offices.2'6 In no way was she involved with the
operation or maintenance of the company's trains. 265 Accordingly, because Luck
was not a "safety employee," Southern Pacific had no compelling interest in
testing her urine for drugs and its invasion of her privacy was, therefore,
unjustified.266
The compelling interest standard for justifying an invasion of the California
Constitution's right of privacy was further entrenched in California law by the
First District's decision in Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp.267 Dayton Hudson, the
owner and operator of Target stores, required applicants for store security officer
positions to take a psychological test.26s According to Target, the test would
screen out applicants "who are emotionally unstable, who may put customers or
employees in jeopardy, or who will not take direction and follow Target
257. Id. at 205-06.
258. 267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
259. See id. at 620-21 (describing Luck's two promotions during her six year employment with Southern
Pacific, as well as the responsibilities she had as a computer programmer during her last four years before
termination).
260. Id. at 621.
261. Id. at 625-26.
262. Id. at 629, n. 13.
263. Id. at 632.
264. See id. at 630 (observing Luck's job "called for her to travel in order to install computers at other
sites").
265. Id.
266. Id. at 631-32.
267. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
268. Id. at 79.
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procedures. 26 9 The test included questions regarding the applicant's religious
attitudes, 270 as well as questions about sexual orientation.27' Three applicants who
took the test filed suit claiming the test violated, inter alia, their state
constitutional right of privacy . 2
Looking both to prior case law and the voters' intent in enacting the Privacy
Initiative, the First District overruled Wilkinson's application of a reasonableness
standard to an employer's invasion of job applicants' privacy rights, instead
holding that any invasion must be justified by a compelling interest. 3 The court
then found that both federal and state precedent requires the employer to show a
"clear, direct nexus exists between the nature of the employee's duty and the
nature of the [privacy] violation.2 74 Applying this standard to Target's conceded
invasion of its job applicants' privacy,275 the First District found that questions
about an applicant's religious beliefs or sexual orientation were at most generally
related to an applicant's ability to perform as a store security officer."" Because
the challenged questions did not satisfy the nexus requirement of specific job-
relatedness, Target's psychological test violated the California Constitution's
right of privacy.277
The only case, to date, addressing marriage under the state constitutional
right of privacy, Ortiz v. Los Angeles Police Relief Ass'n, Inc.27s was decided by
the Second District Court of Appeal in 2002. Cipriana Ortiz was "Administrator
of Retirement and Promotion Benefits" for the Relief Association, a private
nonprofit entity that managed and administered employee benefits for the Los
Angeles Police Department. 9 When Ortiz told the Association's executive
director that she was engaged to be married to a man serving a fifteen year
sentence in California prison for burglary, the Association insisted that she resign
or end the relationship. 0  Since Ortiz's job duties allowed her access to
confidential personal information about police officers, the Association viewed
the relationship as an "unacceptable-and potentially deadly-conflict of
269. Id.
270. Id. at 79-80. The true-false questions included: "I feel sure that there is only one true religion;" "I
go to church almost every week;" "I believe my sins are unpardonable;" and "I believe there is a Devil and a
Hell in afterlife." Id.
271. Id. at 80. Questions included: "I am very strongly attracted by members of my own sex;" "I have
often wished I were a girl;" and "I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices." Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 82-85.
274. Id. at 85-86.
275. Id. at 86.
276. See id. at 87 (finding that Target made "no more than . . . generalized claims about the [test's]
relationship to emotional fitness" and unsupported assertions regarding the improvement of job performance
among store security officers since its implementation).
277. Id.
278. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
279. Id. at 673.
280. Id.
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interest."28' After Ortiz refused to resign or end the relationship, the Association's
Board of Directors fired her, explicitly stating the termination was necessary to
resolve the conflict of interest problem."2
Citing to California cases holding the state's constitutional privacy right
applies to "expressive association," the Second District Court initially concluded
"the right to marry and the right of intimate association are virtually
synonymous., 28 3 Finding the Association's invasion of Ortiz's privacy right
"'serious' in every sense of the word,"2 4 the court debated the proper standard to
apply to the Association's interest in firing Ortiz. Following an extensive survey
of right to marry and anti-nepotism cases, the court concluded that because the
Association's action did not prohibit Ortiz and her inmate fianc6 from getting
married, it did not implicate the constitutional right to marry.28 5 Therefore, the
termination need only be justified by a rational relation to a legitimate employer
interest.286 Perhaps predictably, the court concluded that the Association's conflict
of interest policy protected the personal safety of police officers and therefore
Ortiz's termination under that policy was sufficiently related to the Association's
interest to survive a constitutional challenge.2 7
Two important propositions can be drawn from this line of employee privacy
right cases. The first is that the constitutional privacy right is given high regard
even in the private employment context. Luck and Soroka both found the privacy
right important enough to require the employer to show that an invasion of the
right was justified by a compelling interest.28 Additionally, Ortiz recognized the
"right to intimate association" as being highly protected by both the federal and
state constitutions, even though it applied rational basis scrutiny to the
employer's invasion of the privacy right.290 Thus, it is clear that California courts
place a high value on the constitutionally enumerated right of privacy, including
the right of intimate association, even in the context of private employment.
281. Id. at674.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 678. Later in its opinion the court reiterated that "the state Constitution guarantees not only
the right to marry but also the related right to freedom of intimate association." Id. at 681.
284. Id. at 681.
285. Id. at 683-86.
286. Id. at 685.
287. Id. at 686.
288. See Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629, n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding "no
reason to depart from existing precedent applying the compelling interest test" to article I, section 1 privacy
right cases); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating a compelling
interest standard for privacy right violations is consistent with the voters' intent in enacting the Privacy
Initiative).
289. See Ortiz v. L.A. Police Relief Ass'n., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 678-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(noting that under the California Constitution "the right to marry and the right of intimate association are
virtually synonymous" and acknowledging that "the right to marry is a fundamental right in this country, as
reflected and guaranteed by state and federal law").
290. Id. at 685.
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The second proposition drawn from these cases is that only a high level of
impact on the employer or the public resulting from the employee's protected
conduct will justify termination in violation of the California right of privacy. In
Luck, the Court of Appeal held that Southern Pacific had no justifiable reason for
requiring Luck to submit to drug testing because her job did not involve public
safety.29" ' Likewise, the court in Soroka found questions on a pre-hiring
psychological screening test too tenuously related to the employer's concerns
about placing emotionally unstable persons in charge of customer safety and
inventory control to justify the intrusion they made on the applicants'
constitutional privacy right.292 Ortiz, though it reached an opposite result, also
supports this view of the case law. The court upheld Ortiz's termination, despite
her argument that her employer's policy required her to choose between her
marriage and her job, because allowing her to remain employed after marrying an
incarcerated felon could lead to the acquisition of police officers' personal
information by criminals, thereby putting the officers at risk in direct
contravention of the Police Relief Association. 293 By requiring such compelling
justifications for upholding terminations based on invasion of the privacy right,
California courts provide a high level of protection for that right.
V. RECOGNIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY AS A BASIS FOR
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY CLAIMS
INVOLVING OFF-DUTY INTIMATE ASSOCIATION
Both federal and California law clearly recognize a fundamental right of
privacy regarding intimate association between consenting adults. In Lawrence v.
Texas, the United States Supreme Court reiterated its view that personal
relationships, including the intimate association they incorporate, are protected
by the United States Constitution because of their importance in defining one's
place in the world.294 At a minimum, California's explicit constitutional privacy
right encompasses the guarantees set forth under the federal right.295 Thus, the
concept of free choice about intimate association expressed in Lawrence is
implicitly incorporated into the state constitutional privacy right. However, the
291. Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
292. Soroka, I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
293. Ortiz, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686. Even though the Court of Appeal applied rational basis scrutiny to
the Police Relief Association's conflict of interest policy, it is likely the policy would have survived strict
scrutiny in this case because protecting police officers, particularly the identities of undercover officers, was
certainly a compelling interest of the employer.
294. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (finding criminal sodomy laws "seek to control a
personal relationship that.., is within the liberty of persons to choose" under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (noting the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty guarantee protects "the most intimate and personal choices a person may make").
295. See Barker, supra note 59, at 1133 (stating "[f]ederal guarantees provide a floor below which states
may not venture" in interpreting analogous state constitutional rights).
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protection of intimate association rests on more than mere inference. California
courts have consistently recognized "intimate association" as one of the activities
protected under the California Constitution's article I, section 1 privacy
guarantee.296 Accordingly, California places a high value on protecting intimate
association between consenting adults.297 Nonetheless, to date, no California court
has clearly recognized the constitutional protection of intimate association as a
basis for a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, or a Tameny, claim.2 98
The recognition of a Tameny claim based on invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy regarding off-duty intimate association is appropriate for several
reasons. The first is that the California Legislature has not, and appears unlikely
to, provide statutory protection for such conduct 2 9 9 As a result, the Tameny claim
provides the only remedy for termination based on off-duty intimate association.
Second, recognition would be consistent with California courts' use of the
constitutional privacy right as a limitation on private employers' conduct in other
contexts. Finally, recognizing an intimate association Tameny claim would not
only protect employees but also benefit employers by forcing them to modify
existing conflict of interest or antifraternization policies so that they serve the
employer's business needs while not intruding on the employee's privacy
interest.
California Labor Code sections 96(k) and 98.6, despite some commentators'
interpretations, do not provide substantive enforceable rights regarding off-duty
intimate association. 3°° California courts have held that both sections merely
provide a procedural guarantee that the Labor Commissioner's office will take
assignment of such claims for employees who are unable to pursue them
296. See, e.g., Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 794 (Cal. 1995) (recognizing
"the freedom of intimate association" as one aspect of California's constitutional privacy right); Ortiz, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 678 (recognizing both the right to marry and the right to intimate association as falling under the
California Constitution's right of privacy); see also Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994) (reporting the
that ballot arguments in favor of the Privacy Initiative "refer[red] to the federal constitutional tradition of
safeguarding certain intimate and personal decisions from government interference in the form of penal and
regulatory laws").
297. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) ("California's
privacy protection ... embraces sexual relations."); see also Comm. to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,
625 P.2d 779, 798 (Cal. 1981) (stating California's privacy right protects the "decision whether to bear a child,"
an interest that is "so private and so intimate" that it should be made without government interference); Ortiz,
120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679 ("In California, the right to marry is so fundamental that state legislation and the
Constitution protect an inmate's right to marry.").
298. It is possible to argue that Ortiz did so but the court's analysis focused on the invasion of privacy
claim, not the wrongful discharge claim. However, in determining whether Ortiz's privacy right was invaded,
the court balanced the extent of that right under the circumstances against the employer's interest affected by
her off-duty conduct. Thus, in a sense the Second District engaged in the type of balancing proposed here under
the new intimate association Tameny claim. Nonetheless, because the court did not clearly run the facts through
a Tameny analysis, Ortiz did not actually establish the new claim proposed here.
299. See supra, Part IV.A (concluding that sections 96(k) and 98.6 of the California Labor Code provide
no statutory protection for off-duty intimate association).
300. See supra Part IV.A (discussing cases interpreting California Labor Code sections 96(k) and 98.6
as creating no new substantive rights).
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privately." Thus, the California Legislature has not provided, and appears
unlikely to provide, statutory protection of the right of intimate association.
However, conduct protected by that right can form the basis for claims assignable
302under those Labor Code sections. 2 Moreover, as noted above, California courts
have consistently declared the importance of the constitutional protection of
intimate association. 3 Yet, by not recognizing a Tameny claim based on such
"protected" conduct, the courts essentially allow private employers to flout their
pronouncements of the right's significance. In the absence of statutory protection,
a Tameny claim is necessary to vindicate the intimate association right in the
private employment context.
Recognizing such a Tameny claim would be consistent with California
courts' application of the constitutional privacy right in other aspects of private
employment. While the privacy right is not absolute,3°4 courts have typically
required a strong showing that an employer's action or policy violative of an
employee's privacy right is closely related to the employer's legitimate business
interests."' The drug testing cases are particularly instructive. In Luck, the Court
of Appeal held that collecting urine for drug and alcohol testing was a violation
of the constitutional privacy right in part because it involved an intimate bodily
function.3" The employees' urine was tested for "drugs, alcohol or
medications."307 Consumption of the latter two are in most instances lawful when
done outside the workplace. Thus, Luck also involved, though indirectly, the
effect of off-duty conduct on the employer's business. In that case, because
Luck's job did not implicate public safety, the court held the urine test, and thus
implicitly adverse employment action based on off-duty conduct, a privacy right
violation.3 0 ' Accordingly, it appears a California court would hold uncon-
301. See supra Part IV.A (noting that to date California courts have uniformly interpreted California
Labor Code sections 96(k) and 98.6 as providing purely procedural guarantees).
302. See Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice Corp., 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]o
successfully establish a tortious discharge claim under this provision of section 98.6, [a plaintiff] must allege
her discharge occurred because she asserted a recognized constitutional right."); Barbee v. Household
Automotive Fin. Corp, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ("[I1n order to prevail on a public policy
claim pursuant to Labor Code section 96, subdivision (k), [a plaintiff] must establish that he was terminated for
asserting civil rights guaranteed by article I of the California Constitution.").
303. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
304. See Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting the
"constitutional right to privacy does not prohibit all incursion into individual privacy"); Wilkinson v. Times
Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
305. E.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 84-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (applying the
compelling interest standard to an employer's justification of invasion of job applicants' privacy right); Luck,
267 Cal. Rptr. at 629 (stating any invasion of the constitutional right of privacy "must be justified by a
compelling interest"); see Ortiz v. L.A. Police Relief Ass'n, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 685-86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(applying rational basis scrutiny to employer's conflict of interest plan but characterizing the employer's
interest in preventing the disclosure of confidential information about police officers as "paramount").
306. See Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 629 ("[T]he process of collecting the sample to be tested, which may in
some cases involve visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests.").
307. Id. at 621.
308. Id. at 631-32.
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stitutional a termination based on a positive urine test for alcohol when that
substance was consumed during off-duty hours and the consumption had no
effect on the employee's ability to do his or her job. Likewise, off-duty intimate
association that has no effect on the employee's job ability or employer's other
compelling interests should not be a basis for discharge under California law.
A final consideration supporting recognition of an intimate association
Tameny claim is the effect it will have on employers' conflict of interest or
antifraternization policies. Currently, many such policies are implied;3°9 and even
when written they tend to be rather ambiguous.31° Knowing it will have to defend
any action under the policy as necessary to serve a compelling business interest,
an employer will likely think more carefully about what conduct actually hinders
its business interests and revise its conflict of interest policy accordingly to
prohibit only such conduct. This reassessment and clarification will prepare the
employer for possible future litigation in two ways. First, it will make it much
easier for the employer to show that the conduct underlying the discharge
threatened the employer's compelling interest.3"' Second, it will help the
employer prove the employee had actual notice that his or her conduct was
actionable by the employer, thereby making it more difficult for the employee to
establish a reasonable privacy interest in that particular conduct 1 2 Thus, the
Tameny claim would serve both employees and employers by clarifying company
policy regarding off-duty intimate association, thereby reducing litigation over
discharge based on that conduct.
Even if litigation does result, the burden on employers in defending these
Tameny claims will not be insurmountable. Under this proposed cause of action,
an employer must justify a discharge based on lawful off-duty intimate
association by showing the conduct underlying termination was in conflict with a
compelling business interest of the employer."' But, such a high standard would
not necessarily preclude employers from prevailing against these claims. For
309. See Wilson, Filosa & Fennel, supra note 66, at 79 (observing that many employers "have avoided
adopting any formal policy explicitly addressing the issue of romance in the workplace, choosing instead to rely
on unwritten rules [and their belief that] as a matter of corporate culture or implied policy [fraternization] will
be discouraged or simply not tolerated") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
310. See id. at 86 (advising employers to adopt a "well-drafted" antifraternization policy).
311. See id. at 87 (advising employers to "structure [antifraternization policies] around the impact
potential romantic relationships at work may have on job performance [to] increase the likelihood that a court
will find a rational connection between the policy and the achievement of legitimate business objectives").
312. See id. ("The more notice employees have regarding their employer's anti-fraternization policy, the
weaker their argument that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the romantic relationship.")
To prevail on an invasion of privacy tort claim under California law, an employee must prove he or she had a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding specific conduct. See, e.g., Barbee v. Household Automotive Fin.
Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding Barbee failed to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy because company policy required a supervisor who engaged in an "intimate relationship"
with a subordinate to bring the relationship to the attention of management).
313. Cf Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (declaring mandatory
employee urinalysis, which necessarily invades the constitutional right of privacy, "must be justified by a
compelling interest").
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example, preventing sexual harassment claims would likely be a compelling
business interest. 14 Thus, because a supervisor dating a subordinate might subject
the employer to sexual harassment liability,"' an employer would be justified in
firing either or both employees if they refused to end the relationship. Similarly,
conflicts of interest in the areas of public safety 316 and direct competition for
customers1 7 would also probably continue to be upheld as valid bases for
discharge. However, a discharge based primarily on an employer's particular
moral concerns,"" or a view that an off-duty relationship impacts its business
when it clearly does not,319 would not survive this new Tameny claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
California's private sector employers currently enjoy wide discretion to
discharge employees based on lawful off-duty intimate association. While this is
certainly not a problem of epidemic proportions, it is nonetheless an issue that
should be addressed given the increasing prevalence of intimate relationships
between co-workers. Unfortunately, the California Legislature has taken no
steps to enact legislation to address this problem, nor is such action likely, given
the pressures on legislators to put employer interests over those of employees.32'
Moreover, adoption of a "lifestyle protection" statute like those in force in other
states would not necessarily guarantee protection for off-duty intimate
322
association.
Given this legislative indifference, it is appropriate for California courts to
recognize a Tameny claim for wrongful termination based on lawful off-duty
314. See Wilson, Filosa & Fennel, supra note 66, at 80-81 (noting that because of potential legal liability
for sexual harassment arising from co-worker intimate relationships, "an employer has a legitimate business
interest in drafting rules and regulations" to prevent them).
315. See id. at 79 (observing that supervisor-subordinate relationships "may trigger a sexual harassment
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act").
316. E.g., Ortiz v. L.A. Police Relief Ass'n, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding
termination of a police benefits administrator who was engaged to incarcerated felon because the relationship
"could jeopardize the personal safety of the officers").
317. E.g., Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1071-73 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding termination
of an oil company employee for failure to divest personal interest in fast-lube business because the employee's
position allowed him to obtain information about his side business's competitors).
318. E.g., Staats v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (upholding
employee's termination based on appearing at company convention with a woman who was not his wife).
319. E.g., Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854, 856 (Or. 1986) (observing that an employee's "social
relationship [with a co-worker] did not interfere with [his] performance at work, for during this time he earned
several [performance] awards" but nonetheless holding the employee not wrongfully discharged based on
refusal to end relationship).
320. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text (discussing the growing acceptance of workplace
romance by employees).
321. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing recent statutory restrictions of employees'
legal rights against their employers).
322. See supra Part III.B (concluding that existing "lifestyle protection" statutes fail to adequately
protect employees' off-duty intimate association).
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intimate association. For far too long, courts have been exceedingly deferential to
employers' proffered reasons for discharge at the expense of employee's privacy
rights.3 23 The California Constitution's article I right of privacy provides a
method for the state's courts to shift the balance to its proper place, squarely
between the employer and employee. However, to prevent the balance from
shifting too far in the employees' favor, courts should allow the employer to
defend against this new Tameny claim by showing the conduct prompting the
discharge was actually in conflict with the employer's business interests.324 This
approach would allow employers to continue to terminate employees whose off-
duty relationships adversely affect the workplace or create a conflict of interest.325
Moreover, this new claim would strongly encourage employers to codify their
conflict of interest and antifraternization policies, thereby clarifying acceptable
employee conduct and potentially reducing the number of wrongful termination
claims filed against them.26 In sum, recognition of a Tameny wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy claim based on an employee's off-duty intimate
association would bring a much-needed balance and clarity to the growing issue
of intimate relationships between co-workers.
323. See supra Part 1I.A (chronicling courts' refusals to require employers to provide justification for
discharging employees based on off-duty intimate association).
324. Cf Luck v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 631-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding because
off-duty drug or alcohol consumption did not implicate an employer's interest in protecting public safety,
mandatory urine testing for consumption violated Luck's privacy right).
325. See supra notes 314-17 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 309-12 and accompanying text.

